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UNITED NATIONS HUMAN AND FINANCIAL  
RESOURCES FOR PEACEKEEPING  
IN AFRICA

by

ALIOUNE, SECK

JUNE, 1994

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RESOURCES FOR PEACEKEEPING  
IN AFRICA

by

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
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
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## ABSTRACT

The United Nations, as an international moral authority, will often be requested to intervene in Africa. The United Nations currently has six operations in the African continent (Western Sahara, Liberia, Angola, Rwanda, Somalia and Mozambique). Many African people feel that the United Nations should be involved in other parts of Africa, but United National human and financial resources are not infinite. In other words, the United Nations cannot be in every troubled spot of Africa or be able to mobilize the required Human and Financial resources to bring peace and security to an African continent beset by tribal, ethnic, political, economical and social problems. The United Nations should choose and select the operations that have a likelihood of success. How should these operations be chosen? The United Nations may assess potential and ongoing peacekeeping operations through five necessary criteria for likelihood of success. These five criteria are discussed in this thesis. In addition, a model for assessment of these criteria is introduced. The six United Nations operations are assessed by this model, with a success ranking derived for each.

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# **I. INTRODUCTION**

The United Nations (UN) has faced many peacekeeping challenges in the African continent. Recently, the complexity of these challenges has increased with the end of the Cold War. Part of this complexity is due to the appearance of regional conflicts previously handled by the two super powers (United States and the former USSR).

Currently, the UN has six ongoing peacekeeping operations in Africa. Peacekeeping is defined in this thesis as the separation of fighters to keep peace, or to create a cease-fire that can be respected by all parties. UN peacekeeping may involve the institution of observer units or armed forces units. The UN charter allows the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces, but weapons may only be used in self-defense. UN peacekeeping missions have achieved varying degrees of success. High levels of human and financial resources have been expended by the international community towards these conflicts.

The UN operations in six different countries are examined with relation to each country's political background, peacekeeping criteria, and the human and financial resources expended in each country.

## **A. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

What are the peacekeeping criteria and how are they defined?

What human and financial resources have been expended toward peacekeeping in these six countries in Africa?

## **B. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTION**

Is it possible to assess the peacekeeping criteria with the human and financial resources to predict the success of peacekeeping in Africa?

Chapter II defines the peacekeeping criteria used to evaluate the degree of likelihood of success. Chapters III through VIII describe UN peacekeeping in Western Sahara, Liberia, Angola, Somalia, Mozambique, and Rwanda-Uganda. The background, the UN involvement, the outcome of the UN intervention, and the human and financial costs are given for each operation. Chapter IX assesses and ranks UN peacekeeping based on information obtained about each country. Chapter X evaluates peacekeeping in Africa based upon interviews conducted at the United Nations from April 11-14, 1994. Chapter XI gives the conclusions of this research.

## II. CRITERIA FOR SUCCESSFUL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

### A. OLD CRITERIA

During the Cold War, two criteria were valid for successful UN peacekeeping in Africa.

- The active support of the two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union.
- The neutrality and impartiality of the UN.

The first UN intervention in Africa was in the Congo in the early 1960's. Although the United States supported this mission, it was not successful. The Congo mission did not have support from the Soviet Union, however.

The first real successful operation of the UN in Africa was in Namibia. Namibia was a large peacekeeping effort of the UN in Africa. Namibia, originally a German colony, is located on the west coast of the southern part of Africa between South Africa and Angola. Following World War I, Namibia became the administrative responsibility of South Africa. Many African countries had already achieved independence. At this time, the Western countries of the Security Council of the UN (US, France, and Britain) joined with Canada and Germany to form a contact group which would agree on a process for Namibia to achieve its independence.

In Namibia, the government of South Africa was being fought by the resisting movement, Sowapo (South West African People Organization), helped by the Soviet Union and the African front-line countries, i.e., African neighbor countries of South Africa.

Because of the Soviet Union's connection with Sowapo and because Cuban communist forces were located in Angola, later a stipulation was made by the US that these Cuban forces must be withdrawn from Angola for Namibian independence to be supported. This stipulation forced interaction between the US and the Soviet Union.

Brian Urquhart, former UN Under Secretary General, summarized the Namibian effort in his book, *Life in Peace and War*.

One of the only results of improved East-West relations after 1987 was the successful implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibian independence, which had been settled since 1978. With the United States and the Soviet Union cooperating, agreement was reached on both the independence plan and the progressive withdrawal of the Cuban forces from Angola. The independence process, supervised by the large United Nations civilian military operation, which we had planned between 1978 and 1980, began on April 1989 and concluded triumphantly with the independence of Namibia in March 1990. [Ref. 1]

The second criterion of UN neutrality and impartiality was met because the peacekeeping operations were conducted without major violations and complaints from any party involved. The UN plan was also agreed to by the parties prior to its implementation.

## **B. NEW CRITERIA**

The main objective of the United Nations (UN) is to maintain peace and security around the world. To meet this objective, the UN has developed peacekeeping methods as an alternative to collective security. The application of sanctions against a particular member of the international community which is threatening peace and security in the world is difficult. The sanctions are applied through agreement of the five permanent members of the Security Council. However, these members do not always agree on the ways and means to apply sanctions. Thus, the concept of collective security does not always match with a real and concrete application. The peacekeeping methods

are designed to separate fighters to keep peace or to create a cease-fire that can be respected by all parties. UN forces may be characterized as observer units or as armed forces units. Military force may be employed for UN peacekeeping, but weapons may only be used in self-defense. The ambition of performing these jobs and the necessity of being able to defend themselves if attacked, brings about the legitimate question: What are the criteria for successful UN peacekeeping operations?

According to William J. Durch [Ref. 2], four major criteria are necessary for successful peacekeeping operations. These criteria are:

1. The "local consent" of the disputing parties: the existence of a formal agreement through the sponsorship of an impartial organization, e.g., UN, ECOWAS<sup>1</sup>, and ECOMOG<sup>2</sup>. (Function F1)
2. The neutrality and impartiality of the organization which has sponsored the peacekeeping forces: the sponsoring organization should be neutral and impartial and not show support of any fighting faction. (Function F2)
3. The capability of handling information related to the external and internal environment of the peacekeeping forces: Does the UN know the number of troops each faction has? Does the UN know the amount of ammunitions and equipment being supplied and how it is being supplied? Does the UN know what external forces are helping each faction or that could impede the progress of the UN peacekeeping mandate? (Function F3)
4. "The active support of the great world powers"[Ref. 3] (e.g., United States, Soviet Union). Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, this criteria will either

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<sup>1</sup>ECOWAS - Economic Community of Western African States composed of fifteen member states.

<sup>2</sup>ECOWAS Monitoring Group - forces that ECOWAS sent to Liberia to keep peace prior to the UN involvement.

be linked to the five permanent members of the Security Council or to the only superpower left, the United States. "Active support [Ref. 4]" is defined as support from the superpower separate from its UN involvement. (Function F4)

A fifth condition seems to be necessary for peacekeeping: the goal clarity (UN objectives in a particular country) of the peacekeeping operation. Are the goals clear and stable? Are the UN objectives understood? Do the UN goals shift with time? (Function F5)

These five requirements should be assessed prior to and during UN peacekeeping operations.

Africa is a continent in which some boundaries of states are artificial. The position of clan or tribe connections is very sensitive. Before a commitment of the UN for peacekeeping may be made, the UN should ensure that local consent occurs across tribal and clan lines. Once this agreement is reached, the UN is responsible for maintaining a strict neutrality and impartiality across the fragile acceptance of the parties involved. Any form of favoritism can break the fragile acceptance of peacekeeping operations. This fragility is further aggravated by the fact that followers, loyal to their clan and/or tribe and/or faction, do not analyze or try to understand the situation beyond their daily need of survival. The concept of democracy (ruling of the majority) does not always apply when taking into consideration the interest of the minority parties. Because of the multitude of the actors and the power at stake, the UN should place effective monitoring methods to correctly assess the environment in each case. Understandably, information drawn or processed for the profit of a group (clan and/or tribe and/or faction) might lead to misinformation and misjudgements by UN peacekeepers. As mentioned above, any misinformation or misjudgement could break the fragile equilibrium of trust created by the local consent of the involved parties.



Another necessary condition is to win "the active support of the great power(s)." [Ref. 5] This condition could generally refer to the five permanent members of the Security Council. However, reaching a general agreement within this group is difficult. So it would be more realistic to acquire bilateral support.

Finally, the fifth necessary condition is the setting and understanding of clear goals. Once the initial conditions are met, the UN should be aware that a successful peacekeeping operation may occur only with clear goals. If conditions result in negotiations, the goal may shift, causing a renewal of the whole process. These conditions arise due to the specific makeup of African countries and states. The goals likely to be set in Africa range from the separation of fighting factions to monitoring a cease-fire, to providing humanitarian aid or to monitoring of elections.

An additional factor to consider is that of nation building. The departure of Europeans left Africa divided into small countries and artificial boundaries which cut across ethnic backgrounds, clans and tribes. Although many African countries achieved independence in the 1960's, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity decided not to modify the boundaries inherited from the colonization era ("intangibility of the boundaries" [Ref. 6]). So although Africans may agree to a specific makeup of the countries and state boundaries, this factor excludes the possibility of building nations by changing the boundaries. Therefore, the most objective option left is to promote democracy. Democracy could give the African people a chance to elect leaders with prerequisites of the existence and maintenance of peace. UN peacekeeping could assist in providing this peace by separating the fighters, monitoring the cease-fire conditions and by giving humanitarian aid.

### C. THE RATING OF THE SCALE

The UN Peacekeeping operations in Africa might be assessed by measurement of the criteria of successfulness. This measurement may be set by rating the criteria met for each country on a scale from low to high. The following scale is used to evaluate the five peacekeeping criteria.

1. Factor F1: The "local consent" of the disputing parties: the existence of a formal agreement through the sponsorship of an impartial organization, e.g., UN, ECOWAS<sup>3</sup>, and ECOMOG<sup>4</sup>.
2. Factor F2: The neutrality and impartiality of the organization which has sponsored the peacekeeping forces: the sponsoring organization should be neutral and impartial and not show support of any fighting faction.
3. Factor F3: The capability of handling information related to the external and internal environment of the peacekeeping forces: Does the UN know the number of troops each faction has? Does the UN know the amount of ammunitions and equipment being supplied and how it is being supplied? Does the UN know what external forces are helping each faction or that could impede the progress of the UN peacekeeping mandate?
4. Factor F4: "The active support of the great world powers"[Ref. 3] (e.g., United States, Soviet Union). Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, this criteria will either be linked to the five permanent members of the Security Council or to the only superpower left, the United States. "Active support [Ref. 4]" is defined as support from the superpower separate from its UN involvement.

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<sup>3</sup>ECOWAS - Economic Community of Western African States composed of fifteen member states.

<sup>4</sup>ECOWAS Monitoring Group - forces that ECOWAS sent to Liberia to keep peace prior to the UN involvement.

**5. Factor F5: The setting and understanding of clear goals.**

An assumption is made that these criteria are necessary for a likelihood of success and have the same importance with respect to peacekeeping. This assumption is made to allow the analysis to be as accurate as possible.

- **High:** All requirements are met. For instance, a written agreement exists between the involved parties, or an organization regularly assesses the agreement and promotes complementary or additional agreement, or an organization enforces the implementation of the agreement.
- **Medium:** conditions are acceptable but not all criteria are met. For example, a signed agreement may exist but may not have been honored by all the factions, or the timetable for disarmament may not have been respected, or there is not a regional organization assessing the implementation of the agreement or promoting an additional or complementary agreement.
- **Low:** Minimum requirements are not met. For instance, there may be an incomplete formal agreement, or no faction is respecting the agreement.

### III. WESTERN SAHARA

#### A. BACKGROUND

The area of Western Sahara is between Morocco and Mauritania on the northern coast of Africa. Most "Sahrawis"<sup>1</sup> belong to one of the twenty-two nomadic tribes that exist in Western Sahara. Spain established a colony there from 1884 to 1976. In August 1974, Madrid organized a referendum of self-determination with regards to establishing a "Spanish Sahara." The King of Morocco was opposed to this idea only if the referendum was not successful in returning the Western Sahara to the Kingdom of Morocco. [Ref. 7]

After secret negotiations in November 1974, Morocco, Mauritania and Spain agreed to divide the Western Sahara between themselves. In this decision, the phosphate holdings in central Western Sahara were allocated to Spain. Morocco and Mauritania sent troops, invading Western Sahara by the north and south, respectively. Following the withdrawal of Spain in 1976, the two armed forces were in total charge of Western Sahara.

Resisting movements of Sahrawis formed, called Fente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra de Orio de Oro (Fente Polisario), and were supported by Cuba, Algeria and Libya. The Sahrawis declared independence of Western Sahara and named it the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).

The Polisario decided to adopt guerrilla tactics following several years of warfare with Morocco and Mauritania.

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<sup>1</sup>Persons identifying themselves as people of Western Sahara; they live either inside or outside Western Sahara.

After a series of fact-finding missions by the UN and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) the Security council approved a joint UN and OAU plan called "the settlement proposals" [Ref. 8] for the supervision of cease-fire and referendum on September 20, 1988.

## **B. UN INVOLVEMENT**

In 1985, the Secretary General of the UN and the Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) formed a joint program to find a solution to the problems of Western Sahara.

After separate missions between the UN envoy and the different parties of the conflict, and between the Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and government of OAU, a document called "the settlement proposals" was written. It specified the ways and means for a just and definite solution "of the question of Western Sahara." [Ref. 9] Essentially, the means would be a cease-fire and the holding of a referendum. The people of Western Sahara would choose either independence or integration with Morocco by the right of self-determination.

The UN/OAU joint plan includes a transitional period during which the SRSG "has sole and exclusive responsibility" [Ref. 10] with respect to the referendum. The UN SRSG will be helped by a deputy special representative and an integrated group of UN civilian and military, and Western Sahara civilian police personnel. This entity is called the United Nations Mission for referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

The transitional period begins at the date of proclamation of the cease-fire and will finish when the results of the referendum are declared. As soon as the cease-fire is declared, MINURSO has to:

- Ensure that the reduction of Moroccan forces in Western Sahara is complete,

- Verify that Moroccan and Fente Polisario troops are stationed in only designated areas, and
- To process the release of the prisoners and detainees and supervise the exchange of prisoners of war.

On 29 April 1991, the Security Council adopted resolution 690(1991), deciding to set up the MINURSO mission in Western Sahara. The cease-fire was accepted by the Moroccans and the Sahrawis on 24 May 1991, the starting point of the transitional period.

MINURSO has a standard UN organization consisting of a SRSG and his office, military and civilian components. The military component is expected to be composed of 1,700 personnel with a security unit of about 300 police officers. The civilian component will range in size from about 800 to 1,000 personnel.

MINURSO began with a restricted deployment with an initial setup of ten team-sites/observation posts in the Southern and Northern parts of the Western Sahara. MINURSO also uses helicopters to monitor the cease-fire and to allow for quick reactions to complaints of violations by either side.

### C. THE OUTCOME

The referendum was expected to occur in January 1992 as set up by the UN resolution. The referendum is now more than two years late. This tardiness is due to disagreements on both sides over parts of the plan settlement. The problem lies in the definition and liability of the referendum voters. However, the two parties have not continued to read and evaluate the criteria of the referendum in the same way. While Fente Polisario accepts the census performed in 1974 by the special administration as the exclusive basis of the electorate, Morocco accepts the criteria of December 1991. Actually the efforts of MINURSO was sidetracked by the UN involvement in the

Gulf War. Also at least two of the necessary conditions for a successful peacekeeping operations were not met. Even though Morocco and Fente Polisario accepted the planned settlement, they did not read and evaluate the criteria of vote eligibility for the referendum accurately. Therefore, this is a lack of consent. Second, two of the five members of the Security Council having veto rights view Morocco as a government ally. When balancing this reliable ally against the Fente Polisario, the easy choice is to pick Morocco. Without this support of the Security Council, MINURSO was unable to prevent one party from becoming an obstacle to the plan settlement. This represents a lack of "support of the great powers."

Therefore, the UN is meeting with 38 Western Saharan tribal chiefs. However, this meeting has been postponed due to misrepresentation of some tribal chiefs. This blockage now allows four options:

- To continue and intensify the talks between UN and the different parties.
- The immediate implementation of the settlement plan to the extent that some aspects of the participation in the referendum will be revised.
- To adopt a new alternative effort without consideration of the settlement plan.
- To terminate the UN mission in Western Sahara.

#### **D. FINANCIAL AND PERSONNEL COST**

The UN annual budget for this operation is \$37 million with 340 UN personnel. [Ref. 11] The three-year delay in the schedule activities has strained the planning of the financial and human resources of MINURSO.

## IV. LIBERIA

### A. BACKGROUND

Although Liberia was initially occupied by indigenous people, it was settled by free Black American descendents who went there to settle and rule Liberia in July 1847. This Black American government held until 1980 when a native Armed Forces sergeant, Samuel Doe, overthrew their ruling class. Doe held the government for about ten years until he was killed by rebel forces in September 1990.

The current problem in Liberia has arisen from conflict between the settlers and the indigenous communities and from tribal rivalries within the Liberian people. This civil war began in early 1990 when Doe's government was strongly fought by rebels led by Charles Taylor. Following the death of President Doe, Liberia's political and government structures were chaotic with little law and order until August 1990 when the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) created the Economic Community of Western African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to settle peace in Liberia.

Between 100,000 and 150,000 people have died and 700,000 people displaced to neighboring countries as a result of the civil war. Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, now has an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) headed by President Amos Sawyer. The remainder of Liberia is divided between three main groups, the group led by Charles Taylor (Chief of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia), the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), and the Liberian Peace Council composed of members of the ex-Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), which was decomposed after the death of President Doe. [Ref. 12]



## **B. UN INVOLVEMENT**

The UN Security Council first discussed the Liberian situation in January 1991. The UN encouraged the efforts of the head of states of ECOWAS. The ECOWAS promoted deliberations with the warring factions and reached an agreement to settle peace in Liberia and the Ivory Coast in May 1992. The Security Council of the UN believes this agreement "to be the best possible framework for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Liberia." [Ref. 13]

Fighting in Liberia continued despite the Ivory Coast agreement, prompting an UN resolution 788(1992) in November 1992. This resolution, the starting point of the UN involvement in Liberia, asked for the respect and implementation of the cease-fire and accords as conducted under the auspice of ECOWAS. With the backing of Chapter VII of the UN General Charter, a complete embargo on weapons and military equipment was imposed upon Liberia. The Secretary General also appointed a UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Dr. James O. C. Jonan, to Liberia.

Following his appointment, the SRSG held discussions with the executive secretary and member states of the ECOWAS. A consensus derived from these discussions gave the UN a larger role in the search of peace in Liberia with a commitment for a "systematic cooperation between the UN and a regional organization, as envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter." [Ref. 14]

On 25 July 1993, a meeting was held in Cotonou (Benin) to establish a new agreement. Participants at that meeting included Dr. Jonan (Co-Chairman), President Canaan Banana of the Organization of African Unity (Co-Chairman), Abass Bundu (Executive Secretary of ECOWAS), and the leaders of the fighting factions. The Cotonou Agreement was formulated with a clear framework drawn for a cease-fire and national elections through two major steps: disarmament and demobilization.

The date for the cease-fire was set for 1 August 1993. To prevent violation of the cease-fire agreement, the "parties agreed to establish a joint cease-fire monitoring committee, comprised of representatives of the three Liberian factions, ECOMOG, and the UN." [Ref. 15] This committee was composed of 30 advance military observers from many different countries. On September 22, 1993, the UN Security Council created the observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) by Resolution 866(1993) to expand the efforts of the advanced observer group.

## 1. UNOMIL

As a standard UN operation, UNOMIL obeyed the chain of command of the UN through the SRGS. The UNOMIL is composed of military and civilian components, as follows: 303 military observers, 20 medical personnel, 45 military engineers, 58 UN volunteers, 89 international personnel and 136 local staff. The UNOMIL headquarters is located in Monrovia with four additional locations in Eastern Liberia, Northern Liberia, Western Liberia, and greater Monrovia.

The military aspect of UNOMIL is essentially related to the monitoring and verifying of the compliance with the cease-fire and the embargo on delivery of arms and military equipment. UNOMIL is also required to monitor and verify the encampment, disarmament and demobilization. An additional job of UNOMIL is to report any violation of the agreement including the aspects of International Human Law, training of outside personnel, and the evaluation of financial requirements for the demobilization of the different clans.

The civilian component has two main jobs: to provide humanitarian and development assistance and electoral assistance. The humanitarian and development section works with the UN Special Coordinator's office in assisting relief activities and helping refugees (resettlement, reintegration) through the SRSG. The civilian component will also supervise the entire electoral process from registration to the vote itself

and will monitor final results. The civilian component is comprised of 13 professionals, 40 UN volunteers and necessary support staff. The organization of the election is the responsibility of the Liberian National Transitional Government, acting through the Liberian Elections Commission. The three fighting factions involved in the conflict (IGNU, NPLF, ULIMO) are represented on the Liberian Elections Commission.

## **2. ECOMOG**

### **a. Background**

After many months of Civil War, the 15 countries of the Economic Community of Western African States<sup>1</sup> (ECOWAS) signed an agreement of mutual assistance for defense in Freetown (capital of Sierra Leone) in 1990. Through this agreement, a mediation committee was appointed in Banjul (capital of Gambia), which created the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group known as ECOMOG. The general mandate of ECOMOG was to settle law and order by enforcing the cease-fire negotiated between fighting parties and to keep peace in Liberia. This broad mandate was derived from an "ECOWAS Peace Plan" [Ref. 16] which specified the following actions:

- The agreement of a cease-fire between the fighting factions,
- To monitor the cease-fire,
- The settlement of a widely represented interim government in which all Liberian factions would take part,
- To hold general and Presidential elections within 12 months, and
- To monitor the elections.

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<sup>1</sup>ECOWAS is composed of the following countries: Benin, Burkina-faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bisseau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra-Leone, and Togo.

ECOMOG troops were sent to Liberia in August 1990 and succeeded in stopping mass killings in Monrovia (capital of Liberia). The implementation of the ECOWAS Peace Plan also requested negotiation of an additional peace agreement in Yamoussokro (capital of Cote d'Ivoire) on October 30, 1991 to establish the enforcement steps of the Peace Plan. This agreement, "Yamoussokro IV Accord," [Ref. 17] became the general framework for the solution to the crisis. The Yamoussokro IV Accord directs the encampment and disarmament of all the fighting factions through ECOMOG and establishes transitional institutions for free and fair elections.

**b. ECOMOG in Action in Liberia**

From August to November 1990, 3,000 ECOMOG troops worked to keep fighting factions out of Monrovia or in encampments with the following results:

- The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), composed of former soldiers, were encamped in their barracks,
- The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) was thrown out of Monrovia,
- The Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), headed by Prince Johnson, was confined in a small part of Monrovia (Caldwell area),
- The United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia was derived from the breakdown of the Armed Forces of Liberia. Former members of the AFL fled to Sierra Leone and formed ULIMO in 1990,
- ECOMOG helped install the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU).

During this time, the ECOMOG troops grew from 3,000 to 17,500, with the largest number of forces coming from only one country (75%). Other countries sending forces included Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Mali, and Senegal.<sup>2</sup> For two years until

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<sup>2</sup>Senegal withdrew her forces in January 1993.

October 1992 ECOMOG established law and order in Monrovia. The Yamoussokro IV Accord was supposed to allow disarmament and encampment of all fighting factions. However, the remainder of the Liberian territory had mainly become controlled by Charles Taylor's forces.

In April 1992, Charles Taylor signed an accord in Geneva allowing ECOMOG to secure the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone. Thus, ECOMOG troops were deployed in a buffer zone. Two months later, a gun battle occurred in which Senegalese (part of ECOMOG forces) were captured and executed by NPFL forces. The ECOMOG deployment was then cancelled. All African ECOMOG forces were to be brought back to Monrovia, but were held back by the NPFL until the intervention of The Former US President, Jimmy Carter. This incident became a turning point in the ECOMOG involvement in Liberia. The ECOWAS forces began to act like peace enforcers and were directly attacked by combatants. The NPFL forces held the ECOMOG forces for a month. In response to this hostility, ECOMOG began air strikes against Charles Taylor's forces who could not retaliate.

The incidents between ECOMOG and NPFL caused the reformation of the AFL (Armed Forces of Liberia). The AFL was the former Armed Forces during the era of President Samuel Doe. After Doe's death, the AFL was disarmed and encamped.

### c. The Outcome

ECOMOG has brought peace and order to Monrovia and has stopped the ethnic mass killings. However, the spirit and the letter of Yamoussokro IV Accord have not been completely successful because the warring factions are not entirely disarmed and encamped.

ECOMOG forces began to deploy throughout the country on March 1, 1994 to supervise the disarmament of the factions. Over 60,000 soldiers of the two main factions, ULIMO and NPLF, must be disarmed. Disarmament operations are

scheduled to begin March 14, 1994. However, prior to the deployment of ECOMOG forces, Charles Taylor, leader of NPLF - the most powerful faction, stated that he would never turn over any arms to soldiers from ECOMOG. This statement is a renewed signal of distrust of Charles Taylor toward the leading country (which provided 75% of ECOMOG forces). Charles Taylor therefore requested that forces from Uganda and Tanzania be brought in. These forces were not part of ECOMOG and Taylor felt they would be more impartial and would also dilute the the leading country dominance. Thus, 1700 soldiers were sent to Liberia to satisfy this request. The ECOMOG field commander acceded to these requests. The ECOMOG forces have been deployed as follows: the Ugandi and Tanzanian soldiers have been deployed to the territory controlled by Charles Taylor; the Ghanaan soldiers are in Western Liberia where ULIMO is dominant, and the Nigerian soliders are in southeast Liberia. ECOMOG peacekeepers are paid between \$5 and \$10 per day (\$150-300 per month) per soldier with a total peacekeeping budget of \$500 million per year. [Ref. 18]

### **3. FINANCIAL AND PERSONNEL COSTS**

The UN peacekeeping operation has been set up since September 1993. Fundamentally, the UN has met at least one necessary condition of peacekeeping: the consent of all parties to peace through the Cotonou Peace agreement. The UNOMIL operation was evaluated to cost \$40 million for a seven month period. [Ref. 19] Thus far, UNOMIL seems to have a high probability for success.

The UN operation in Liberia has the support of one great power: the United States, meeting another condition set for success in peacekeeping efforts. The US forces have assisted the agreement efforts by providing airlifts of African forces to Liberia.

The UN is spending \$40 million for this operation in Liberia.

## **C. ASSESSMENT OF ECOMOG**

### **1. FINANCIAL AND PERSONNEL COST**

ECOMOG intervention in Liberia seems to be a model for regional conflict resolution. In fact, it seems to be a cost effective solution. ECOMOG peacekeepers are paid between \$5 and \$10 per day (\$150-300 per month) per soldier with a total peacekeeping budget of \$500 million per year. Conversely, UN peacekeepers cost \$1000 per soldier per month. [Ref. 20]

### **2. PROBLEMS OF ECOMOG**

The large percentage of forces present from one country is a great concern. One country provides most of the soldiers and equipment for Liberia peacekeeping. This country is thus perceived to dominate the region.

Nevertheless, the general hope is that her forces become balanced within ECOMOG. This balance must be monitored by ECOWAS. Also, the Organization of African Unity should ensure that a single country agenda is not being applied in Liberia.

### **3. GREAT POWER SUPPORT**

The US has always publically recognized its support of the ECOWAS peace plan. The US reaffirmed its support in a hearing before the US Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on African Affairs on June 9, 1993. The Assistant Secretary of State said, "We seek a negotiated settlement with the assistance of the UN and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) of full disarmament of all Liberian warring factions." [Ref. 21]

### **4. RELATIONS BETWEEN UN AND ECOMOG**

UNOMIL and ECOMOG are working together in Liberia, each with a specific job to accomplish. The main responsibility of ECOMOG is to enforce the Cotonou

Agreement signed by the fighting parties and witnessed by the UN representative and the OAU special envoy, under the auspices of ECOWAS. UNOMIL is responsible for humanitarian actions in Liberia and is also responsible for monitoring neutral and impartial implementation of the Cotonou agreement. Although these two entities do not have the same chain of command, they cooperate within the following formal framework. (See Figure 4.1) [Ref. 22]

Liberia is divided into four regions for UNOMIL and four sections for ECOMOG. The regions and the sectors run across the same geographical areas. A UNOMIL and ECOMOG headquarters is located within each region or section. The airports and ports are under dual control of both UNOMIL and ECOMOG. The airports, port units, observer, liaison, sea headquarters are provided with UNOMIL investigative teams. The containment teams are under the control of the UN. This theoretical framework works according to a reporting relationship from the level of the UN Secretary-General and the ECOWAS Chairman down to the smallest element of ECOMOG and UNOMIL.



Source: United Nations Security Council, report of the Secretary-General on Liberia-5 September 1993




Figure  
Reporting Relationship of UNOMIL and ECOMOG

ECOWAS early initiatives in Liberia prior to UN intervention brought significant progress to Liberian peacekeeping, particularly by stopping the mass killing. Although ECOWAS is not a military organization, its fifteen members had many valid reasons for intervening prior to obtaining help from the international community.

The decomposition of Liberia had to be held to definite limits to avoid increased problems in that region. The ECOWAS initiative was applauded in Africa, because the regional organization had better understanding of the African culture and the underlying concepts and aspects of tribal conflicts. However, the ECOWAS intervention did have some shortcomings:

- The important issue is that the national sovereignty is disappearing because of the collapse of the economy and the mass killings. The government then becomes willing to do whatever ECOWAS asks it to do to get security which becomes an absolute value. The ECOWAS policy is applied by ECOMOG, but within ECOMOG, one country has an hegemonic position. The fear is that the country's own national interest is derived from this hegemonic position. This concern raises the issue of balance of power within ECOMOG forces.
- The imbalance in ECOMOG forces, reflected by an hegemony of one country, might be the main factor preventing the full confidence of Charles Taylor, the leader of the strongest faction in Liberia, toward ECOMOG. This hegemony is indirectly challenged by some Liberian neighboring countries which are suspected to be helping Charles Taylor on an undercover basis, although these countries are members of ECOWAS. In an attempt to balance the forces in ECOMOG, troops of non-ECOWAS countries have been sent to Liberia (Uganda and Tanzania). This is a classic move to shift the balance of power, but no other country can balance the hegemonic country which is far more powerful than many African

countries together. The result is that guerrilla warfare could continue to be ongoing in this region, although the incidences are far less important than the mass killing at the beginning of the conflict. The risk is that the credibility of ECOWAS might be damaged. The balance to this hegemonic power should be created through the UN and US. The UN can effectively balance the forces in Liberia by sending more troops and in the meantime, ECOMOG may be monitored. The US gives financial help to ECOMOG through ECOWAS with conditions requiring specific behaviors from the leading country with respect to its role.

Countries have the dilemma of benefiting from security without economic cost (the leading country bears the important share of the burden) and the appeal of directing their efforts towards democracy by Western Countries which tie their help to the principles of democracy for African countries.

- The final point is that as one observes the diagram of reporting relationships, it is noticeable that an ECOWAS political authority is not physically represented in Liberia. The Field Commander could be obliged to make political decisions for which he is not mandated or he can choose not to make a decision until he consults the Chairman of ECOWAS. Therefore, ECOWAS should appoint a special representative to Liberia to fill any political vacuum.

## V. ANGOLA

### A. BACKGROUND

Angola, a former colony of Portugal, became an independent state in 1975. Angola has been ruled by a communist party since its independence but has been fought by anti-government rebels. The communist party was aided in these efforts by Cuban forces. In an effort to stop civil war, the United States, Soviet Union and South Africa met in 1988 for negotiations. An agreement was made to discontinue aid to the rebel forces and for Cuba to withdraw from Angola. Angola and Cuba then asked the UN to settle a UN mission to assist in the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. This mission was named the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEMII). All Cuban forces were withdrawn from Angola by May 25, 1991. [Ref. 23]

Following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the weakened communist government of Angola held talks with the rebels. The two groups eventually signed the Peace Accords for Angola ("Acordos de Paz" [Ref. 24]) in May 1991. According to the Peace Accords, government and rebel troops must be gathered in 46 "assembly areas" for UN observers to check the numbers of troops, the number of weapons, irregular troops (on both sides - government and rebels), demobilized troops and the soldiers expected to become part of the new Angolan Armed forces.

The Peace Accords for Angola also scheduled "free and fair elections under the supervision of international observers." [Ref. 25] The UN Security Council therefore decided to expand UNAVEM's mandate to supervise the Angolan elections (Presidential and legislative). Although the National Electoral Council (NEC) was responsible

for the organization of the elections, in which all legal parties were represented, UN observers gave logistic help during the elections (including airlifts to reach remote areas). The elections were finally held on September 22 and 30, 1992.

## **B. UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT**

Once the withdrawal of the Cuban forces was completed, the UN started the mission to implement the Peace Accords between the Angolan government and the rebels. The implementation of the Peace Accords for Angola required UNAVEMII to adopt the following mandates from the UN Security Council:

- To monitor the cease-fire, and
- To verify the neutrality of the Angolan police.

## **C. OUTCOME**

Despite the general assessment by UN officials that the "elections were free and fair," [Ref. 26] the leader of the former rebel faction rejected the results and immediately engaged in violence against the government. After a new cease-fire and diplomatic efforts, the leader of the rebel movement accepted only the results of the legislative elections which gave the victory to the communist government party. He would not accept the outcome of the presidential election.

The UN intervention in Angola has had limited results due to the problems during the cease-fire, the pre-election period and the presidential and legislative elections. The demobilization and the monitoring of the disarmament of the troops, as well as the inventory and monitoring of the weapons were also at fault. In reality, after many years of civil war, 16 months became too short a time period to build trust between the government and the rebel forces.

#### **D. FINANCIAL AND PERSONNEL COSTS**

The UN Security Council has authorized 350 military personnel, 216 police observers, 87 international and 155 local civilian staff to be part of UNAVEM, but only 70 observers are deployed. The two UN missions in Angola (UNAVEM I and II) have cost \$144 million.

## VI. SOMALIA

### A. BACKGROUND

From its independence on July 1, 1960, Somalia was proud of its democracy and the relationships created among the pastoral group, the clans, and the elites. The elite groups were generally educated in Italy during the Italian occupation. The Somali constitution was democratic until 1969 when General Siad Barre overtook the government after a coup d'etat. [Ref. 27]

Siad Barre, however, had his own agenda during the Cold War, in which the main actors were the United States and the former Soviet Union. Siad Barre even switched his alliance from the Soviet Union to the United States in the 1980's. Consequently, he lost his credibility both inside and outside his country. Also, with the end of the Cold War, Somalia no longer occupied an important geostrategic position.

The loss of credibility of the head of state caused Somalia to also lose its credibility. Therefore, Somalia lost financial aid from other countries.

Regional uprisings started to occur in the 1980's and continued throughout the early 1990's. After losing control, General Barre left the country on January 27, 1991. Since that date, Somalia has split into many factions. The factions have become involved in power struggles in which 100,000 Somali's have been killed, both from the fighting and from hunger. The peak of the deaths was in October 1992 when 1000 Somali's died per day, among them 500 children. Somalia as a state disappeared.

After Siad Barre left the country, the UN started humanitarian actions but the lack of security and the violent fights in Mogadishu caused the UN to suspend its actions until the UN received cooperation from the International Committee of the

Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations. The fights were between two rival clans: one of the Interim President Ali Mahdi and the other of the Chairman of the United Somali Congress, General Mohamed Farah Aidid.

The situation in Somalia gradually became worse to the concern of the UN Secretary General, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Islamic Conference. Consultations were held in the UN headquarters from February 12-14, 1992. Participants were the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of Islamic Community (OIC), the Interim President Ali Mahdi, and General Aidid. The outcome of these consultations resulted in an "Agreement of the Implementation of a Cease-fire" [Ref. 28] between the two main factions fighting in Mogadishu. The agreement also specified the authorization for the UN to deploy teams of military observers (20 people each) to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu.

## **B. UN INVOLVEMENT**

After the Security Council adopted the cease-fire implementation on March 17, 1992, resolution 746 was adopted, authorizing the deployment of a technical team to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu. In April 1992, a resolution 751(1992) created the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM). The Security Council also asked for continuation of negotiations between all the parties of Somalia to work toward the organization of a conference of national reconciliation and unity. The Security Council also asked for financial help from the international community to implement the "Secretary-General's 90 day plan of action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia." [Ref. 29] The SRSG was appointed April 28, 1992.

The involvement of the UN in Somalia has been very complicated. Initially, fifty unarmed uniformed United Nations military observers were sent to monitor the cease-fire. At this time, the UN agreed to provide security personnel to monitor the safety



and security of seaports and airports to protect supplies, deliveries and humanitarian relief centers. On August 12, 1992, the Somali main factions agreed that the UN should send 500 United Nations security personnel.

Despite the agreement, the cease-fire in Mogadishu was not effective. On July 27, the Security Council decided to send another technical team to Somalia, marking the UN escalation in Somalia. Additional UN forces were sent:

- Four additional United Nations security units of 750 each.
- Three logistic units totalling up to 719 personnel.

By August 28, 1992, the UNOSOM operation consisted of 4,219 personnel. Despite all these efforts, the situation in Somalia was still not secure or safe, and in fact, the situation was even deteriorating.

The peak of the deaths occurred in October 1992 with 1000 Somali's dying per day, half of them children. Somalia now had no central government and the only law was the law of the guns. Neither the UN nor the non-governmental organizations could do their job.

Upon a recommendation of the Secretary General, the Security Council adopted resolution 794(1992) on December 3, 1992 to authorize "the use of all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia." [Ref. 30] The Security Council asked member states to contribute toward this effort, whether in cash or kind. The United States thereupon sent 25,000 troops to Somalia to save "thousands of innocents." [Ref. 31] This effort has become known as the successful "Operation Restore Hope" (December 5, 1992 to May 1, 1993).

The US led the first element of the United Task Force (UNITAF), deployed in Mogadishu on December 9, 1992. The UNITAF forces spread their actions, not only in Mogadishu, but to all distribution centers throughout the country. These UNITAF

forces quickly brought security to humanitarian efforts. The great success of UNITAF forces in Somalia caused the UN to enlarge the UNOSOM MANDATE to enforce the cease-fire permanently, to control heavy weapons, to disarm the lawless gangs and to create a new Somali police force. The UN thought to effect a transition from UNITAF force operations to peacekeeping operations. This transition leads to the establishment of UNOSOM II.

The Security Council resolution 794(1992) (UNOSOM II) allowed the deployment of 37,000 troops to Somalia. The Somali security environment had become safer and the humanitarian relief centers were able to safely feed the people. However, these actions were performed without a regular government. The new mandate of UNOSOM II included eight objectives:

1. To monitor the cease-fire and the commitment of all Somali factions to the agreement of Addis Ababa.<sup>1</sup> [Ref. 32]
2. To prevent any action of violence and to take action towards any source of violence.
3. To control the heavy weapons; to destroy any heavy weapons or to transfer them to the new Somali Army (if formed).
4. To collect lawfully the small arms of non-authorized armed elements; to assist in the registration and security of these arms.
5. To settle and maintain security in seaports, airports and throughout the lines of communication necessary for humanitarian relief organizations.

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<sup>1</sup>The Somali political movements attended the National Reconciliation Conference at Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) from 4-15 January 1993. This conference was initiated by the United Nations in relation with the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity, and the Organization of Islamic Committee. At this conference, the participants agreed on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities of disarmament.

6. To ensure protection of the equipment, installations, and personnel of the UN, the non-governmental organizations, and internal organizations of Somalia.
7. To clear the land mines in the country.
8. To assist the refugees and displaced persons toward integration in their country.

To carry out these new mandate requirements, the deployment of a 20,000 unit military component, 8,000 logistic personnel, and 2,800 civilian personnel were sent to Somalia. The United States also agreed to send a tactical reaction force to support the force Commander of UNOSOM II.<sup>2</sup>

### C. THE OUTCOME

According to its mandate, UNOSOM had the duty of disarming the factions which led the violent oppositions against the UN. Following an ambush that killed 25 Pakistani's on June 5, 1993, the UN Security council authorized the Secretary-General by resolution 814(1993) to take "all necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks." [Ref. 33]

The June ambush was the turning point of the UNOSOM action in Somalia. This ambush led to various incidents causing 81 casualties among the UN forces and to the decision of the US to withdraw its forces.

UNOSOM II then undertook strong military actions enabling the removal of Radio Mogadishu from the United Somali Congress (General Aidid's organization). UNOSOM II also destroyed and neutralized militia weapons and equipment. It began to be obvious that effective disarmament of the faction was a prerequisite of the achievement of the overall mandate of UNOSOM II. Upon recommendation of the Secretary General, the Security Council decided to resettle the Somali Police, the judicial and

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<sup>2</sup>The SRSG of the Somali effort is a retired Admiral of the US Navy and the commanding officer of UNOSOM is a Lieutenant-General from Turkey.

penal systems, and to apprehend and bring to justice criminal elements, particularly those responsible for the ambush of Pakistani peacekeepers.

The activities of the different clans and factions in Somalia did not prevent humanitarian efforts. Many improvements were noticed in the country. Humanitarian relief centers were active in distributing supplies throughout the country. A safe and secure environment was effected due to the protection of UNOSOM. Schools closed for many years were again functioning. Somali people were no longer starving. Early death was being prevented by nutrition and immunization programs. UNOSOM II was also caring for the refugees and displaced and were sending them home.

Economic activities of agriculture and commerce were starting again after a decline of over four years. Actually, Somalia needed an overall reconstruction program, requiring first the restoration of security and stability. UNOSOM II was actively patrolling to apprehend and bring to justice those responsible for the Pakistani ambush and for the instigation of violence against UN troops. In one action, the United States Rangers tried to capture General Aidid's top aides on October 3, 1993. In their fight against Aidid's militia men, eight US soldiers lost their lives and 75 were wounded. The body of one US soldier was subjected to indecent treatment. This tragic event marked a decline of UN intervention in Somalia. The US decided to withdraw its forces by March 1994, causing other countries to also decide on withdrawal. Somali clans and factions are thus rearming themselves and more fighting is anticipated.

#### **D. FINANCIAL AND PERSONNEL COSTS**

The Security Council authorized 28,000 military personnel from 29 countries and 2,800 civilian staff. An additional 17,700 US troops not under the operational command of UNOSOM II are also in Somalia. This figure includes the Quick Reaction

Force formed to support UNOSOM, but after the withdrawal of Western forces. The 20,000 UN peacekeepers in Somali come mainly from developing countries.

The UN mission in Somalia costs \$977 million a year.

## **VII. MOZAMBIQUE**

### **A. BACKGROUND**

Mozambique originally a Portugese colony, achieved independence in 1975. However, a rebel movement, FRELIMO (Front of Liberation of Mozambique, the fought against the colonialists and eventually took over the government. This newly established government was opposed by another movement called the Revolutionary National Movement of Mozambique (RENAMO) for a period of 14 years. In October 1992, the government and the rebels signed a General Peace Agreement allowing the UN to enforce a Peace Agreement, monitoring the implementation and to give technical assistance for general elections.

The terms of the agreement stated that the cease-fire would start no later than October 15, 1992 which would be called E-Day. Following E-Day, the fighting factions were to be separated and concentrated in designated areas with demobilization of soldiers serving in the factions. Some of these soldiers would be eligible for the new Mozambican Defence Forces. The agreement also authorized the preparation of elections to be held no later than October 15, 1993. [Ref. 34]

### **B. UN INVOLVEMENT**

UN representative initially participated in negotiations between the Mozambican government and the rebel movement, arriving at a General Peace Agreement signed on October 4, 1992 in Rome, Italy.

The General Peace Agreement asked the UN for assistance in implementation of the Agreement through monitoring of critical tasks related to the cease-fire, the elections and also for humanitarian assistance. The agreement specified that the UN

would not allow the elections to be held until the military situation between the government and the rebels was resolved to allow proper implementation of the General Peace Agreement. The enforcement of the Agreement was the responsibility of a supervisory and monitoring commission chaired by the United Nations. A United Nations Resolution 782(1992) appointed an interim Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and a team of 25 observers for the Mozambique operations, now named ON-UMOZ.

The SRSG and the team of 25 members arrived in Mozambique on E-Day.

"As the Civil War intensified, Malawi and Zimbabwe, with the agreement of the government of Mozambique, deployed troops in the transport corridors, to assist the government's forces in keeping them open. These corridors, which run across Mozambique from the Indian Ocean to landlocked countries to the North and West, are of critical importance for Southern Africa." [Ref. 35]

The UN has now authorized between 7,000 and 8,000 UN troops and civilian personnel in Mozambique. At the current time, 30 military observers and 6,250 infantry and support personnel are in Mozambique. Observers were set up at Nampula and Beira with two teams in charge of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Mozambique. This withdrawal was an important request for the rebel forces to win in the General Peace Agreement.

The SRSG organized a meeting in Maputo between the Government and REN-AMO, requiring a high level of representation from both sides. The purpose of this meeting was to settle the constant violations of the cease-fire. The SRSG also appointed the supervisory and monitoring commission members with the following mandate:

- To guarantee the implementation of the agreement,
- To solve disputes which might occur between the parties, and

- To guide and coordinate the activities of subcommittees.

The supervisory and monitoring commission was chaired by a UN representative and was comprised of the Mozambican government, RENAMO, Italy (the mediator state), France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States (observer state at the Rome talks) and the Organization of African Unity. Germany also became a member of this entity at a later date. Three subsidiary committees were set up:

- The cease-fire commission,
- Reintegration of Demobilized Military Personnel Commission, and
- The formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces.

## 1. ONUMOZ

ONUMOZ is composed of four components: political, military, electoral, and humanitarian. all political matters related to the General Peace Agreement were referred to the SRSG. The SRSG and his office were responsible for giving directions towards peace in Mozambique. By doing so, enforcement of the General Peace Agreement should occur. The SRSG delegates decisions to the supervisory and monitoring commission and the subsidiary committees.

The monitoring of the cease-fire is also the responsibility of ONUMOZ. Once the cease-fire is successful, ONUMOZ should ensure that the demobilization and containment of the troops is effective and that the collection, stockage and destruction of weapons occurs. ONUMOZ is responsible for ensuring that all foreign forces leave Mozambique. ONUMOZ is tasked with monitoring the dissolution of private and non-formal armed groups that have existed throughout the Civil War years.

The military component also had tasks related to the humanitarian aspect because ONUMOZ was given the responsibility to keep the vital infrastructure intact



and to protect national and international relief organizations. The military component is divided into three military regions with subdivisions of 49 assembly areas.

The many transitional phases of this efforts requires a close interrelationship between the military and humanitarian components of ONUMOZ. During this process, 110,000 soldiers will be disarmed, concentrated and demobilized and finally, integrated into civil society, requiring humanitarian and professional support. Cooperation will also be vital during the mine clearance operations to ensure a safe environment. Additionally, observers will need to be placed at strategic areas including airports, ports, and other important vital points in the country. ONUMOZ must therefore work together with the United Nations Office for coordination of these efforts.

The general headquarters of the humanitarian component is established in Maputo (capital city of Mozambique) with extensions throughout the regions and provinces. Duties of the humanitarian component are:

- To return refugees in neighboring countries to their homes,
- To give food and other relief to soldiers gathered in the assembly areas,
- To assist the 100,000 demobilized soldiers with conversion to civilian life,
- To identify training needs and employment opportunities, and
- to project its actions to the future through education.

The humanitarian needs of almost six million people must be met. Among these six million, 4.5 million were internally displaced persons (including 370,000 to be demobilized), with 1.5 million refugees in neighboring countries. The focus of the humanitarian program has shifted from a typical quick emergency support program to and important program of home settlement and a restart of life. The current estimate

is that 1.5 million Mozambicans have returned home through this humanitarian effort. This successful reinstallation of the refugees and displaced persons is a prerequisite for a normal electoral framework.

The electoral division of ONUMOZ (through the SRSG) is tasked with monitoring all phases of the electoral process, although the elections themselves will be organized by the National Elections Commission (NEC). The NEC is responsible for directing the general elections in relation to the government, the National Election Commission, and the Mozambican political parties.

The established government of Mozambique has taken the initiative to write and distribute a draft electoral law to RENAMO and all involved political parties in March 1993. However, RENAMO and the other political parties claimed they didn't have enough time to study this law. Eventually, this law became an obstacle to the progress of the electoral process.

#### **a. The False Start of ONUMOZ**

After the General Peace Agreement was signed, a timetable was agreed to for the cease-fire, the gathering of the fighting troops, their demobilization and finally, the elections. Although the cease-fire was broadly respected, many delays occurred because of the lack of confidence of all disputing parties towards each other with respect of how and when to disarm and demobilize.

RENAMO also wanted ONUMOZ to deploy 65% of their forces before demobilization, however, the UN did not meet this desire because legal and logistic administrative problems existed. An accurate level of UN support required for the ONUMOZ effort has never been accurately assessed, causing further delays. These problems created the necessity for a new timetable to allow the full deployment of ONUMOZ observer teams and troops and the establishment of logistics in the three

operational regions of Mozambique. The new timetable was established to begin on June 3, 1993 with a 16 month completion period.

### **C. THE OUTCOME**

Once the deployment of ONUMOZ troops occurred, decisive steps were achieved. These steps include the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Zimbabwe and Malawi. However, important phases of the Peace Agreement have still not been achieved. These phases include:

- The creation of the National Election Commission,
- The concentration and demobilization of troops, and
- The settlement of a new Mozambican Defence Forces.

An important step towards the establishment of the Mozambique Defence Forces is the UN resolution 850(1993) approving a UN chair for a Joint Commission for the formation of these forces.

Direct talks between the President of Mozambique and a representative of REN-AMO in August 1993 resulted in agreement of both parties of the new timetable. Since that time, progress has been noticed in the demobilization, cease-fire, formation of the Mozambican Defence Force, the humanitarian program and the electoral activities. In the General Peace Agreement, 49 assembly areas for demobilization and containment were identified with 36 of them accepted by all parties. Twenty-three ONUMOZ teams are deployed to these 36 areas. Therefore, containment is expected to succeed. In addition, five infantry battalions have been deployed to protect the corridors.

### **D. FINANCIAL and PERSONNEL COSTS**

The UN is spending \$290 million per year for this mission with 6,600 UN personnel involved. [Ref. 36]

## **VIII. RWANDA-UGANDA**

### **A. BACKGROUND**

Rwanda was a Belgian colony prior to independence in the 1960's. However, two powerful tribes exist in Rwanda, the Hutu and Tutsi. The government is in the hands of the Hutu tribe, causing tribal uprising between the Hutu and the Tutsi. This situation has led to a circle of tribal uprising and government repression. The most serious incident between the armed forces of the government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) occurred in October 1992 between the borders of Rwanda and Uganda. [Ref. 37]

The countries of Uganda and Rwanda wrote separate letters to the UN security council asking for military observers to be deployed along the 150 kilometer common border of the two countries. Uganda asked for protection of its borders from the Rwandese fighting factions and Rwanda asked for assistance in negotiating peace between the Rwandese fighting factions.

Concurrently, the Organization of African Unity and the Republic of Tanzania were also trying to create a peace agreement between the two fighting factions. A meeting was held in Dar-es-Salam from March 5-7, 1993. The fighting parties committed to negotiate a settlement and a cease-fire on March 9, 1993. [Ref. 38]

### **B. UN INVOLVEMENT**

Upon receiving the letters from the governments of Rwanda and Uganda, the security council asked the government and rebel parties of Rwanda for an agreement of the cease-fire and overall fulfillments of the Dar-es-Salam conference. The security council thereupon sent a technical team to Rwanda-Uganda, authorized by Resolution

846(1993). This resolution was named the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR).

A total of 81 military observers were deployed for UNOMUR by the end of September 1993. UNOMIR's mandate focused mainly on the collection and transportation of weapons, ammunition, and military equipment from Uganda to Rwanda. At the same time, the Organization of African Unity was trying to deploy a neutral military observer group (NMOG) to Rwanda to assist in monitoring the cease-fire. Following this positive initiative of the OAU, the UN decided to initiate the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda and integrated the UNOMUR program into UNAMIR.

The mandate of UNAMIR is "to contribute to the establishment and maintenance of a climate conducive of the secure installation and subsequent operation of the transitional government." To achieve this mandate, UNAMIR, with assistance from NMOG, must: [Ref. 39]

- Ensure that the cease-fire is respected by all parties.
- Establish an expanded demilitarized zone (DMZ) and demobilized procedures.
- Give special attention to the security situation throughout the transitional period.
- Give assistance for mine clearance.
- Monitor the violations of the peace agreement.
- Help to reinstall the refugees and displaced persons.
- Provide protection to the non-governmental and international organizations for relief supplies.

### **C. THE OUTCOME**

The Security Council decided that UNAMIR's actions should be performed step-by-step until national elections are held in September 1995 and a new government installed. However, UNAMIR will only be allowed to stay in Rwanda for three months following the installation of the new government.

On April 6, 1994, the President of Rwanda was killed in a plane crash following a meeting in Arusha. Riotings and mass killings occurred in Kigali (the capital city of Rwanda) following the plane crash. Reportedly, the Rwandese Prime Minister, 11 UN peacekeepers and as many as 200,000 Rwandese were reported to be killed. [Ref. 40] France, Belgium, and US took measures to evacuate their nationals. The Belgium batallion and other UN forces were withdrawn from the UN peacekeeping forces. Now only 270 UN peacekeepers are left in Rwanda, following the decision of the Security Council to maintain residual UN forces at a level of 270. In May 1994, pressures from the International community generated a decision from the Security Council to send an additional 5,500 UN personnel to Rwanda.

### **D. FINANCIAL AND PERSONNEL COSTS**

The Security Council originally authorized 2,779 military personnel and observers, with 231 civilian personnel to be added to the mission for police monitoring, international civilian staffing and local personnel staffing. However, 2,500 UN peacekeepers were deployed in Rwanda until April 25, 1994, when the Security Council decided to retain only 270 residual UN forces in Rwanda.

The cost of the observer teams of the Rwanda-Uganda mission was projected to be \$4 million per year. However, this cost has escalated to \$98 million with incorporation of the UN troops and the cooperation with the OAU/NMOG.

## **IX. ASSESSMENT OF UN PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA**

### **A. WESTERN SAHARA**

The two disputing parties of the Western Sahara, the Fente Polisario and the Kingdom of Morocco, agreed to accept a cease-fire in May 1991. The cease-fire has held except for minor violations by both parties. Because of these minor skirmishes, the local consent factor (F1) is given a medium rating.

The UN has appeared to be neutral and impartial towards both factions, allowing factor (F2) to be rated High.

In contrast, the UN sent limited manpower to support the Western Sahara effort with enough manpower. The limitation of troop support in turn lowered the management and capability of information handling. The factor (F3) is thus assigned a Low rating. A main explanation for these ratings is that simultaneously the Security Council and the US were forced to support Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion. This combined effort toward Kuwait pulled attention from the UN Peacekeeping operation in Western Sahara. This explanation is also valid for the low rating of factor F4 because the great powers could not devote time, energy and resources towards this effort. Finally, the UN goal of achieving a respected cease-fire and to hold a referendum remained clear, so factor F5 may be rated high.

**TABLE I: PEACEKEEPING RATINGS FOR WESTERN SAHARA**

Local Consent	M
Neutrality and Impartiality	H
Capability of Handling Information	L
Support of the Great Powers	L
UN Goal Clarity	H

**B. LIBERIA**

Four major disputing parties exist in Liberia, the NPLF, the IGNU, the AFL, and ULIMO. Through ECOWAS mediation, these factions have signed and held the Cotonou Accords. The local consent in Liberia is therefore rated at least medium. The UN remained neutral and impartial toward all four factions. This factor is also rated High.

The capability of handling information related to the external and internal environment by the UN is also high as the UN stepped in following regional Peacekeeping Operations (ECOMOG) of three years. This period of time allowed greater access and analysis of information. This factor is rated High.

The US power is also helping Liberia. At least \$289 million in support has been spent on Liberian peacekeeping efforts, \$29 million in support of regional peacekeeping and \$260 million for humanitarian aid. [Ref. 41] This factor is rated High.

The UN goal in Liberia is very clear: to achieve cease-fire, to assist humanitarian teams and to hold general elections. This factor is rated High.



**TABLE II: PEACEKEEPING RATINGS FOR LIBERIA**

Local Consent	M
Neutrality and Impartiality	H
Capability of Handling Information	H
Support of the Great Powers	H
UN Goal Clarity	H

**C. ANGOLA**

Two disputing parties exist in Angola: the government and the rebel movement (UNITA). As Peace Accords exist for Angola, the local consent of the parties may be rated Medium. The neutrality and impartiality of the UN in Angola is strong, so this factor is rated High. In contrast, the capability of handling information related to the external and internal environment of UN forces was not strong. Otherwise, the UN could have been able to delay or stop the election process, knowing that the rebel leader would not accept a loss. Therefore, the rating of this factor is assigned as Low.

Although the US and the Soviet Union have participated actively for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, neither great power supported Angola and the US did not even recognize the existing government. This factor can be rated Low.

The clarity of the UN goal did not change and was to maintain a respected cease-fire and to hold the elections. This factor is therefore rated high.

**TABLE III: PEACEKEEPING RATINGS FOR ANGOLA**

Local Consent	M
Neutrality and Impartiality	H
Capability of Handling Information	L
Support of the Great Powers	L
UN Goal Clarity	H

**D. SOMALIA**

The evaluation of the criteria for Somalia are rated in two steps, based on the evolution of UNOSOM.

**1. UNOSOM I**

The local consent of the disputing parties was very low following the Resolution 751(1992) creating UNOSOM. The Security Council was asked for continuation of negotiations between the disputing parties. An implicit recognition existed in the UN that no local consent had been reached, although the UN agreed to send 500 United Nations security personnel in August 1992. This factor may be rated Low.

For UNOSOM I, the neutrality and impartiality of the UN was maintained, allowing this factor to be rated High. In contrast however, information was not handled well for the first phase of UNOSOM due to the lack of initial local consent and therefore, no local cooperation.

At this time, no great power was giving support to Somalia. Evidence of this statement is that the UN member states were asked to contribute to this effort by the Security Council. Thus this factor is rated very Low.

During this phase, the UN goal in Somalia was clear: to support humanitarian efforts.

**TABLE IV: PEACEKEEPING RATINGS FOR SOMALIA - UNOSOM I**

Local Consent	L
Neutrality and Impartiality	H
Capability of Handling Information	L
Support of the Great Powers	L
UN Goal Clarity	H

## **2. UNOSOM II**

These ratings changed during UNOSOM II. After the decision of the Security Council to send 37,000 troops to Somalia and following the US "Restore Hope" operation, the Somalian environment became safer and the humanitarian relief centers were able to feed the Somalis. However, the local consent of the fighting factions had still not been achieved. Thus, the local consent factor remained low.

In contrast, the support of the great powers became high because the US sent 25,000 troops and Germany, France and Italy also sent troops to support the Somalian effort.

The capability of handling information was still low because the local consent was still missing and there was no cooperation within the population.

Two other factors dropped significantly. These factors were the neutrality and impartiality of the UN and the UN goal clarity. A main reason for the drop of these factors is due to the decision of the UN to arrest a faction leader (General Aidid). The UN goal therefore became unclear, allowing the UN to appear biased and partial.

**TABLE V: PEACEKEEPING RATINGS FOR SOMALIA - UNOSOM II**

Local Consent	L
Neutrality and Impartiality	L
Capability of Handling Information	L
Support of the Great Powers	H
UN Goal Clarity	L

#### **E. MOZAMBIQUE**

The two disputing parties signed an agreement of cease-fire on October 4, 1992. However, this agreement has never held. The local consent factor is rated medium to at least allow for the signing of the agreement. The UN is neutral and impartial in Mozambique, so this factor is rated High.

In contrast, the capability of the UN to handle the information related to the external and internal environment is Low. A lengthy time passed before the appropriate level of UN forces could be determined as the UN could not figure out the number of troops of either the government or the rebel factions.

Although some middle powers (France, United Kingdom, and Italy) participated in the elaboration and realization of the agreement signed in Rome, the UN Peacekeeping effort in Mozambique was not supported outside the framework of the UN by any great power. The fact that these European countries, Germany, and the African Organization Unity became members of the supervisory and monitoring commission improves the support factor to a medium level.

The UN goals in Mozambique were to hold elections, to support a humanitarian effort and to train and educate Mozambican soldiers for the new Mozambican Defence

Force. However, trying to accomplish long term goals over a short period of time made the UN goals unrealistic. This factor is rated Low.

**TABLE VI: PEACEKEEPING RATINGS FOR MOZAMBIQUE**

Local Consent	M
Neutrality and Impartiality	H
Capability of Handling Information	L
Support of the Great Powers	M
UN Goal Clarity	L

#### **F. RWANDA-UGANDA**

Local consent was obtained through mediation of the OAU and the Tanzanian Republic. However, on April 6, 1994, the President of Rwanda was killed in a plane crash. The plane crash allegedly occurred because of a rocket attack. The local consent factor, initially given a high rating, is now changed to low, due to the appearance that all factions are not respecting the formal agreement. Despite the mass killings in Kigali, where 11 UN peacekeepers were killed, the UN has not retaliated and has remained neutral and impartial, allowing a high rating for this factor.

The cooperation and collaboration between the OAU and the Tanzanian Republic allowed the UN to work with the rebels and the Rwandese government. However, the level of cooperation was not high enough to allow the UN to accurately evaluate the internal and external environment of Rwanda. Therefore, this factor is rated Low. Possibly the UN could have predicted the risk to the President with a different level of cooperation and communication.

Repatriation of nationals was organized by Kigali, France, Belgium and the US after the mass killings. This move is evidence that no great power was supporting the peace process in Rwanda outside the framework of the UN security council. This factor is rated low.

Two UN missions, UNOMUR and UNAMIR, exist in Rwanda-Uganda. The goals for these two missions are clear. The mission for UNOMUR is to monitor and prevent the transport of troops from Uganda to Rwanda. The mission for UNAMIR is to “contribute to the establishment and maintenance of a climate conducive of the secure installation and subsequent operation of the transitional government.” [Ref. 42] The UN clarity factor is therefore rated High.

**TABLE VII: PEACEKEEPING RATINGS FOR RWANDA-UGANDA**

Local Consent	L
Neutrality and Impartiality	H
Capability of Handling Information	L
Support of the Great Powers	L
UN Goal Clarity	H

## **G. OVERALL ASSESSMENT**

The assessment of the six UN operations in Africa is done through the mean of the rating scale as elaborated by Michael Brassard in the “Memory Jogger Plus” using seven management and planning tools. [Ref. 43]

The five factors are rated low (1 point), medium (3 points), and high (9 points). According to Brassard, these numerical values may be used to rank the factors. The scale used by Brassard is a tool which organizes information such as characteristics,

functions, and tasks into sets of items to compare. In comparing UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, the Brassard matrix diagram allows analysis of each country based on the principle that an intersection between the factors of success and the countries might indicate a relationship.

The first questions asked is: Is there a relationship between the likelihood of success for a peacekeeping operations in a given country with one particular factor of success? If the answer to this question is yes, the next step determine the strength of the relationship. The level of relationship will be high, medium, or low.

- High = 9; there is a strong relationship or impact between UN policy (or decision or outcome) and a given factor with respect to the likelihood of success of a given UN operation.
- Medium = 3; there is some relationship or impact between UN policy (or decision or outcome) and a given factor with respect to the likelihood of success of a given UN operation.
- Low = 1; there is a weak (or none) relationship or impact between UN policy (or decision or outcome) and a given factor with respect to the likelihood of a given UN operation.

After multiplying these factors by the ratios, an analysis may be made of the ranking of the operations (horizontal) and the score for each factor (vertical) in the table below.


TABLE VIII: SUMMARY RATINGS FOR ALL COUNTRIES

Country	F1 Local Consent	F2 Neutrality Impartiality	F3 External/ Internal Environment	F4 Great Power Support	F5 Goal Clarity	Total	H = 9 M = 3 L = 1	Rank
Liberia	M	H	H	H	H	1M, 4H	39	1st
Rwanda-Uganda	L	H	L	L	H	3L, 2H	21	4th
Angola	M	H	L	L	H	1M, 2L, 2H	23	2nd
Western Sahara	M	II	L	L	H	1M, 2L, 2H	23	2nd
UNISOM I (Somalia)	L	H	L	L	H	3L, 2H	21	4th
Mozambique	M	H	L	M	L	2M, 2L, 1H	17	6th
UNISOM II (Somalia)	L	L	L	H	L	4L, 1H	13	7th
TOTAL	15	55	15	25	47			



# Ranking of UN operations

Year 1994



Likelihood of success(H=9, M=3, L=1)

If we graph this information with the cumulative factor rates on the x-axis and the likelihood of success on the y-axis, we see three groupings of countries:

- Group 1: Liberia
- Group 2: Angola and Western Sahara
- Group 3: Somalia, Mozambique and Rwanda-Uganda

From the calculations, Liberia may be considered as successful, Angola and Western Sahara moderately successful, and Mozambique, Rwanda-Uganda and the combined Somalian campaigns as only achieving a low rate of success.

If the same ratios of 9, 3, and 1 are assigned to the factors (F1-F5), the values are as follows in ranked order:

- F2 = 55 (Neutrality and Impartiality)
- F5 = 47 (UN Goal Clarity)
- F4 = 25 (Support of the Great Powers)
- F1 = 15 (Local Consent)
- F3 = 15 (Capability of Handling Information)

The ratings show that the UN remained impartial and neutral throughout all missions except UNISOM II. Also, the rating for goal clarity is high, with only Mozambique and UNISOM II having low goal clarity. These two factors have much higher values than the remaining three factors.

The involvement of an optimal regional organization seems to be a determinant ingredient in successful peacekeeping operations. The presence of an optimal regional

organization also significantly increases the ratings of the factors related to the local consent (F1), and the information handling (F2). If the local population cooperates with the UN, UN peacekeepers are more informed about the internal and external environment, making peacekeeping implementation easier to achieve. For instance, many meetings were held for Liberia through ECOWAS involvement to assess the implementation of the Yamoussokro and Cotonou accords. The factions agreed to the disarmament and encampment process through these accords.

In Rwanda-Uganda, regional OAU forces were present before the UN became involved, but these OAU forces were not as strong as ECOMOG forces to secure the Kigali Airport, at least not from preventing the shooting of the plane of the President.

However, a large regional organization without a commitment of forces seems to be less effective, as OAU is in Rwanda. For instance, the UN operation in Western Sahara, although supported verbally by the OAU, does not have the benefit of commitment of regional forces. Angola and Western Sahara are in a middle level in the chart, lacking the commitment of strong regional forces. These two countries lack great power support.

At the lowest level are Somalia, Mozambique and Rwanda-Uganda. Somalia in UNISOM I had UN neutrality and impartiality as well as goal clarity. Following the changes in Somalia between UNISOM I and UNISOM II operations, these two values slipped from a high rating to a low rating. The great power support changed from low to high. Somali peacekeeping efforts started out at a higher rating than Mozambique, but dropped with the increased involvement of the UN. At this time, Somalia lacks every factor except the support of the great powers (through March 1994 when US and main European forces withdrew).

All five conditions necessary for a successful UN peacekeeping operation are now missing in Somalia. The large number of factions in Somalia (at least 15) make it

difficult to achieve a lasting "local consent." In addition, the UN issued a warrant to arrest one faction leader, allowing the UN to be perceived as being non-neutral (although that faction leader was suspected of involvement in the killing of Pakistani Peacekeepers in June 1993). This lack of neutrality on the part of the UN also lowered the rating of the internal and external environment. Moreover, the UN's ambitious agenda in Somalia changed the goal clarity from high to low. This overall rating is supported by the cumulative values in the table.

Mozambique lacks two important factors: the level of accurate information available related to the external and internal environment and the UN goal clarity. Perhaps the goals described in the UN mandate for Mozambique are too ambitious for peacekeeping. Matters such as education and training are long term goals difficult to realize within such a short period as defined by ONUMOZ mandate.

Although the UN neutrality and impartiality factor is high, the local consent and the support of the great power factors are rated medium. The local consent is ranked as medium as ONUMOZ is one year behind schedule indicating that some aspects of the local consent need to be worked out. Although Italy and France helped to settle the agreements between the fighting parties, the United States is not supporting the UN mission in Mozambique outside the framework of the Security Council. This factor is rated medium.

## **H. OVERALL FINANCIAL AND PERSONNEL COSTS**

Although money is necessary for all UN peacekeeping operations, it is not the determinant factor for conflict resolution in Africa. A look at UN personnel and financial costs support this premise.

**TABLE IX: UN PERSONNEL**

	Military	Police and Civilian	Total	Rank
Somalia	45,700	2,800	48,500	1st
Mozambique	6,552	48	6,600	2nd
Rwanda-Uganda	2,548	231	2,779	3rd
Angola	350	458	808	4th
Liberia	368	278	646	5th
Western Sahara	324	103	427	6th


Source: United Nations, Information Notes, Update #2, June 1993.

Following the mass killings of April 1994, the UN Security Council decided to withdraw all but 270 UN troops from Rwanda. [Ref. 44]

Below is a summary of the financial costs for each country discussed in peace-keeping operations.

# UN personnel in Africa

Year 1994(source UN,June 1993)



**TABLE X: COMPARISON OF UN FINANCIAL EXPENDITURES AND  
LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS**


	Budget (US\$)	Rank	Likelihood of Success	
			Scores	Rank
Somalia	977 million	1st	13	5th
Mozambique	290 million	2nd	17	5th
Angola	144 million	3rd	23	2nd
Rwanda-Uganda	98 million	4th	21	4th
Liberia	40 million	5th	39	1st
Western Sahara	37 million	6th	23	2nd

Source: United Nations, Information Notes, Update #2, June 1993.

The data show that higher amounts of personnel and finances have been used to support Somalia and Mozambique than other countries. The highest amount of resources have thus gone to the two countries with the lowest likelihood of success, based on peacekeeping criteria developed in this thesis. Interestingly enough, the amount of personnel and financial resources expended toward the remaining four countries is equal or less than that for Mozambique alone. This result shows a definite contrast between the likelihood of success for peacekeeping as related to the support given for peacekeeping.

# UN annual peacekeeping budget


Year 1994 (Source: UN, June 1993)





# UN annual peacekeeping budget

Year 1994 (Source: UN, June 1993)



## **X. INTERVIEWS AT THE UNITED NATIONS**

After developing the model for likelihood of success for UN peacekeeping in Africa, interviews at the UN headquarters were conducted to acquire additional information to supplement the research done in this thesis. The interviews were conducted with desk officers and military advisors of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, with the exception of Western Sahara. The Western Sahara officials were out of town and unavailable. The peacekeeping model was explained to the interviewees and various questions were asked to obtain an assessment of a "UN view" towards the success of African peacekeeping. The interview process includes prewritten questions, personal interviews and individual rankings of peacekeeping operations in Africa. Interviews were conducted with the desk officers and military advisors at the UN headquarters from April 10-14, 1994. Individual questions asked are listed in Appendix A. The list of interviewees is listed in Appendix B.

### **A. LIBERIA**

The interviewees rated all factors high for this UN operation. However, the interviewees found Factor 1 to be the most important because it describes the willingness of the local people to be helped. The desk officers and military advisors feel that the likelihood of success might be affected if this condition is not met.

When asked about the regional organization's impact on the likelihood of UN success, the interviewees thought that ECOMOG had a helpful role in Liberia. However, they felt that the leading country in ECOMOG acts like a benevolent hegemonic power that seems to be willing to pull out of Liberia as soon as possible.

**TABLE XI: INTERVIEWEE'S SUMMARY RATINGS FOR LIBERIA**

F1	Local Consent	H
F2	Neutrality and Impartiality	H
F3	Capability of Handling Information	H
F4	Support of the Great Powers	H
F5	UN Goal Clarity	H

**B. RWANDA-UGANDA**

This UN operation is rated high for Factors 2 and 5, but low for Factors 1, 3, and 4.

The interviewees would have viewed the ratings of Rwanda-Uganda high until April 6, 1994 when the President of Rwanda died in a plane crash. This incident is considered as evidence that the local consent was not high and the handling of information by the UN was also not high. Following the death of the President of Rwanda, mass killing occurred and as many as 200,000 Rwandese [Ref. 45] were reported to be killed. Also, France, Belgium and the US have evacuated their nations, giving additional evidence that the support of the great powers in Rwanda is not high. The current ratings by the interviewees for the UN mission in Rwanda are given below.

**TABLE XII: INTERVIEWEE'S SUMMARY RATINGS FOR  
RWANDA-UGANDA**

F1	Local Consent	L
F2	Neutrality and Impartiality	H
F3	Capability of Handling Information	L
F4	Support of the Great Powers	L
F5	UN Goal Clarity	H

**C. ANGOLA**

The ratings of this UN operation by the desk officers and military advisors are: Low for Factors 1, 2, and 4. Indeed, the whole process of negotiating additional accords acceptable to the fighting factions is ongoing. The UN mission in Angola is rated high for Factors 2 and 5. However, the interviewees think that the UN mission should be enlarged once the rating of Factor 1 improves.

**TABLE XIII: INTERVIEWEE'S SUMMARY RATINGS FOR ANGOLA**

F1	Local Consent	L
F2	Neutrality and Impartiality	H
F3	Capability of Handling Information	L
F4	Support of the Great Powers	H
F5	UN Goal Clarity	H

**D. WESTERN SAHARA**

This information was not able to be obtained as the Western Sahara officials were out of town.

### **E. SOMALIA (UNISOM I)**

The desk officers and the military advisors rated the first phase of UNISOM high for Factors 2 and 5, but they rated Factors 1, 3, and 4 low. They considered UNISOM I to be mainly a humanitarian operation after the successful US operation "Restore Hope." The officers felt that the UN did not have local consent, although many attempts were made to obtain local consent.

**TABLE XIV: INTERVIEWEE'S SUMMARY RATINGS FOR SOMALIA  
(UNISOM I)**

F1	Local Consent	L
F2	Neutrality and Impartiality	H
F3	Capability of Handling Information	L
F4	Support of the Great Powers	L
F5	UN Goal Clarity	H

### **F. SOMALIA (UNISOM II)**

For this UN operation, the desk officers and military advisors rated all factors low. They think that "local consent" has never been obtained by the UN in Somalia, although this factor appears to be indispensable. UNISOM II was carried out under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which does not require the consent of the host country to carry out the UN mission of peace and security.

All great powers pulled out from Somalia in March 1994, evidence of lack of support by the great powers.

Information gained from the interviews allows a conclusion to be made that the UN mission evolved under Chapter 7 because Somalia had no government and even now still has no government. The overall assessment and ratings are:

**TABLE XV: INTERVIEWEE'S SUMMARY RATINGS FOR SOMALIA  
(UNISOM II)**

F1	Local Consent	L
F2	Neutrality and Impartiality	L
F3	Capability of Handling Information	L
F4	Support of the Great Powers	L
F5	UN Goal Clarity	L

#### **G. MOZAMBIQUE**

The desk officers and military advisors feel that the UN mission in Mozambique is on track, even though a one year delay of the proposed timetable exists. Their ratings of Mozambique are:

**TABLE XVI: INTERVIEWEE'S SUMMARY RATINGS FOR  
MOZAMBIQUE**

F1	Local Consent	H
F2	Neutrality and Impartiality	H
F3	Capability of Handling Information	M
F4	Support of the Great Powers	L
F5	UN Goal Clarity	H

## H. SUMMARY

The interviews of the UN desk officers and military advisors revealed two main factors, the most important factors in their view:

- The political willingness of the people being helped by the UN (the local people), through the represented fighting parties. For the desk officers and military advisors, this local consent factor (Factor 1) is felt to be a prerequisite for UN involvement in Africa. The example used to show the importance of this is Somalia, for which the factions did not want to cooperate until the UN designated an African special Envoy (Ambassador Kouyate from Guinea)<sup>1</sup> This new special envoy was successful in obtaining a peace agreement signed by the two main factions in Somalia.
- The second most important factor is the command and control factor responding to the questions: Who is in charge? Who is doing what? Who reports to whom? According to the interviewees, this issue is very important and goes beyond Factor 3 - the handling of information related to the internal and external environment. The UN does not have, and does not want to have, the intelligence network to monitor the influx and use of weapons and war equipment in these operations.

A third issue discussed with the UN desk officers and military advisors is the role of regional organizations. Their answers reflected favorably toward regional organization by a majority of 2/3. Their rationale is that the regional organization has a least cost. The problem of command and control can be solved because the regional organization is more familiar with the internal environment.

Unfavorable reasons for a regional organization are that the least cost argument may be an illusion. As the settlement of the conflict by a regional organization may take

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<sup>1</sup>UN Special Envoy in Somalia after the departure of former UN Special Envoy Admiral Howe (Retired).

a longer time, there may be a higher cost in the long run. Also, Africa does not have a long-term military organization (like NATO - North American Treaty Organization). Member participants in NATO have training operations together with a standardized operative language (English). Another important reason is the UN policy to avoid involvement of neighboring countries. The UN does not want to impair its neutrality and impartiality when neighboring countries have a national interest in their neighbor's future.

Although 1/3 of the desk officers and military advisors advanced the above reasons for not believing in regional organization, the premise of this thesis and 2/3 of the desk officers and military advisors maintain that a regional organization is a determinant ingredient for successful UN peacekeeping in Africa. Regional organization is the prerequisite frame with the ability to improve all factors necessary for success. From this information, Liberia is rated as the best UN peacekeeping operation with the highest likelihood of success. Much of this success in Liberia is due to the fruitful participation of ECOMOG under the auspices of ECOWAS.



TABLE XVII: SUMMARY RATINGS FOR ALL COUNTRIES


Country	F1 Local Consent	F2 Neutrality Impartiality	F3 External/ Internal Environment	F4 Great Power Support	F5 Goal Clarity	Total	H = 9 M = 3 L = 1	Rank	Rank of the Theoretical Analysis
Liberia	H	H	H	H	H	5H	45	1st	1st
Rwanda-Uganda	L	H	L	L	H	3L, 2H, 3L	21	4th	4th
Angola	L	H	L	H	H	2L, 3H	29	3rd	2nd
Western Sahara	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	2nd
UNISOM I (Somalia)	L	H	L	L	H	3L, 2H	21	4th	4th
Mozambique	H	H	M	L	H	1M, 1L, 3H	31	2nd	6th
UNISOM II (Somalia)	L	L	L	H	L	5L	5	5th	7th
TOTAL	22	46	16	22	46				

According to UN desk officer and military advisor interview information, the country grouping is:

- Group 1: Liberia
- Group 2: Angola and Mozambique
- Group 3: Somalia and Rwanda-Uganda

# Ranking of UN operations

By UN desk officers after interviews



## XI. CONCLUSIONS

A comparison of the six UN on-going peacekeeping operations in Africa have been made through an analysis of five criteria determined to be necessary for peacekeeping. Four major criteria are borrowed from William J. Durch, who gave these criteria as being necessary for successful peacekeeping: [Ref. 45]

1. The "local consent" of the fighting factions evaluated through the existence of formal agreement(s) under the auspices of the organizations such as UN, ECOWAS, OAU, or even a military organization such as ECOMOG.
2. The "neutrality and impartiality" of the organization sponsoring the peacekeeping forces. The expectation for this sponsoring organization to be neutral and impartial is fundamental, allowing for credibility of the organization. The organization is required to be able to talk to all factions without bias and discrimination and to be able to be recognized as neutral and impartial by all factions.
3. The "capability of handling information": When the UN is sponsoring a peacekeeping operation in Africa, the UN often commits many human and financial resources. The optimization of these resources requires that the UN can derive appropriate information from external and internal environments regarding peacekeeping with that given country. For example, the UN should know: How many forces the factions have? How these factions obtain inside and outside support? The answers by the UN to these questions are necessary as they enable better decisions regarding a given operation in a country.

4. The "support of the great powers": During the Cold War, the support of the great powers was limited to the US and the Soviet Union. Because of the bipolar system, each superpower was able to persuade the countries within its zone of influence, e.g., each superpower could obtain desired actions from these countries. However, this situation is no longer valid. Therefore, the support of the great powers should be sought through countries which are permanent members of the Security Council. Active support is defined now as the support on a bilateral basis.
5. These four criteria are supplemented by a fifth criteria: UN goal clarity. Is the mandate of UN peacekeeping in Africa generally clear and not subject to different interpretations? If the UN wants to accomplish many things within the period of peacekeeping, does the multiplicity of the goals make the situation unclear? The primary reaction is to ask questions such as: Are the goals clear and stable? Are the UN objectives understood? Do the UN goals shift with time?

These five criteria should be assessed before, during, and after UN peacekeeping operations. This assessment will allow the UN to redirect its efforts if necessary or to act appropriately. How should these criteria be assessed? A suggested method is to assess the five criteria through a rating scale of Low, Medium, and High ratings.

- Low: No requirements are met.
- Medium: Acceptable conditions exist but some important conditions are missing.
- High: All conditions are met.

After assessing these criteria, a ranking of the UN operations is obtained. This ranking may be used to determine whether UN operations should be started or continued.

The assessment from my research before the UN interviews yielded the following findings for the countries studied. Three groupings of countries with respect to UN operations emerged with different levels of likelihood of success.

- Group 1: Liberia, with a high level of likelihood of success.
- Group 2: Western Sahara and Angola with a medium likelihood of success.
- Group 3: Rwanda-Uganda, Somalia, and Mozambique with a low level of likelihood of success.

The UN is providing high amounts of human and financial resources for these six peacekeeping operations. The UN should take into consideration the level of likelihood of success. The UN should consider shifting resources from the countries with low likelihood of success to countries with high levels of likelihood of success. In particular, Group 3 countries should be left to a strict level of humanitarian type of UN operation until the fundamental factors of success are met.

The UN interviews provided both similar and divergent findings.

#### **1. Common Points:**

The thesis research and the UN interviews agree that Liberia has the highest peacekeeping rating and Somalia (both UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II) and Rwanda-Uganda have the poorest ratings.

#### **2. Divergent Points:**

A main divergent point brought out by the interviews with the UN desk officers and military advisors is that the UN mission in Mozambique is rated higher. The interviews portrayed Mozambique in an optimistic view because no major violations exist. They felt that the peacekeeping program is on track and doing fairly well.

This thesis research pointed out that the UN mission in Mozambique has already experienced a one year delay. This delay shows that the "local consent" factor is not at a sufficient level for peacekeeping. Moreover, the UN mission in Mozambique has also experienced a high cost in human and financial resources. Therefore, the international community might not want to pledge additional resources towards Mozambique without an acceptable level of "local consent." Due to these factors, the ranking given by the UN desk officers and military advisors seems to be too optimistic.

The overall conclusion is that: the UN operation in Liberia has a high likelihood of success and deserves more help from the UN. The international community will probably be willing to give support through organizations such as ECOWAS and ECOMOG. The UN operations in Somalia and Rwanda-Uganda have a poor likelihood of success. The start of these operations, as related to the peacekeeping criteria listed here, are now seen as false starts because the basic requirements were not met. Therefore, UN actions in these countries should now be restricted to a level of humanitarian actions until the concerned countries find the necessary strength to fulfill the fundamental conditions of minimum likelihood of success.

#### **A. RECOMMENDATIONS:**

The peacekeeping operations were ranked from the criteria developed in Chapter II. The Liberian mission seems to have a high likelihood of success. However, continual reassessments of updates of the agreements between the fighting factions under the auspices of ECOWAS should be performed. The Yamoussokro and Cotonou accords should be implemented by ECOWAS. The human and financial resources spent toward the UN mission in Liberia seem to be reasonable.

The UN peacekeeping efforts in Angola and Western Sahara were rated as having less likelihood of success unless the factors for success improve. These two operations

do not appear likely to achieve the outcomes stated by the UN Security Council. These low likelihoods of success are due mainly to lack of "local consent" expressed in terms of political willingness, an insufficient handling of the information related to the external and internal environments, and a lack of support of the great powers.

The UN operations in Somalia, Rwanda and Mozambique should be reassessed. These three operations lack local consent and good handling of information related to the internal and external environments. Moreover, the UN goals for Somalia and Mozambique are unclear and perhaps too ambitious. The human and financial resources used toward Rwanda, Somalia and Mozambique should be readjusted until peacekeeping criteria are met. The people of these countries must demonstrate a commitment to develop local consent. Local consent is one among five peacekeeping criteria that is indispensable to obtain continued commitment of the international community. In the meantime, these three UN operations should be adjusted to a level of humanitarian operation.

The resources should be utilized toward more successful peacekeeping operations, e.g., Liberia or Western Sahara or Angola. The international community will continue to support Africa only if the African people show commitment to viable and sizable regional organizations, helping to promote peace and seniority in the continent. A political willingness to solve African violence could be magnified with this type of commitment by the people.



# **APPENDIX A**

## **UNITED NATIONS INTERVIEW PROCEDURES**

### **A. PURPOSE OF THE INTERVIEW**

Two main purposes exist for the interviews of United Nations desk officers and military advisors. These are:

- To identify current human and financial resources for United Nations peacekeeping in Africa.
- To make recommendations for the optimization of United Nations resources in African peacekeeping operations.

The answers to these questions will assist in the ranking process for the six current UN operations in Africa (Western Sahara, Liberia, Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda-Uganda, and Somalia). This data will be combined with peacekeeping criteria to rank the overall likelihood for success for each mission.

### **B. DEFINITIONS OF THE FIVE FACTORS OF LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS FOR UN PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA**

The definitions of successful criteria as well as the rating scale were explained to the desk officers and military advisors prior to the interviews. The criteria are:

- The "local consent" of the disputing parties: the existence of a formal (or many agreements) through the sponsorship of an impartial organization, e.g., UN, OAU, ECOWAS. This function is named F1.

- The “neutrality and impartiality” of the organization which has sponsored the peacekeeping forces: the sponsoring organization should be neutral and impartial. This function is named F2.
- The “capability of handling information” related to the external and internal environments of the peacekeeping forces. Does the UN know the number of troops each faction has? Does the UN know how ammunition and equipment are being supplied? Does the UN know what external forces are helping each faction or that could impede the progress of the UN peacekeeping mandate? This function is named F3.
- The “active support of the great powers” e.g., the United Nations, the Soviet Union. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, this criterion will either be linked to the five permanent members of the Security Council or to the only superpower left, the United States. “Active support” is defined as support from the superpower that is separate from the involvement of that power within the UN, e.g., United States is helping Liberia on a bilateral basis (both within and outside the auspices of the UN), or the US is helping Somalia on a bilateral basis with respect to the settlement of a particularly difficult situation (civil war, fights between government and rebels). This function is named F4.
- The “UN goal clarity” or the UN objectives in a particular country of the peacekeeping operation. Are the goals clear and stable? Are the UN objectives understood by the fighting parties? Do the UN goals shift with time? This function is named F5.

### **C. THE UN RATING SCALE**

The UN peacekeeping operations in Africa might be assessed by measurement of the criteria of likelihood of success. The measurement may be set on a scale from low to high for each criterion. The scale below is used to evaluate the five peacekeeping operations. These five criteria are assumed to be with equal importance with respect to each operation. This assumption is made to allow the analysis to be as accurate as possible.

- High: All requirements are met. For instance, a written agreement exists between the fighting parties, or an organization assesses and promotes complementary or additional agreements, or an organization enforces the implementation of the agreements or accords.
- Medium: The conditions are acceptable, but not all conditions are met. For example, a signed agreement may exist but has not been respected by all factions, or the timetable for disarmament may not have been respected; or a regional organization is not in place to assess the implementation of the agreement or to promote additional or complementary agreements or accords.
- Low: Minimum requirements are not met. For instance, an incomplete formal agreement may exist, but no faction is respecting these agreements or accords.

### **D. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS**

Each interviewee was asked the same questions, listed below, and asked to evaluate the five peacekeeping criteria as they relate to the six UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. The evaluation form follows the questions.

**1. Question 1**

Would you please relate the background of each UN peacekeeping operation (Western Sahara, Liberia, Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda-Uganda, and Somalia) from your perspective? Please include political details that you are aware of. If a regional organization is involved, please describe how it was set up.

**2. Question 2**

How would you rate the five following factors (criteria) with respect to the UN operations undertaken in Africa?

**3. Question 3**

Why did the OAU and ECOWAS get involved in Mozambique, Western Sahara, Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda-Uganda, and Angola?

**4. Question 4**

How do you view the ECOWAS involvement in Liberia?

**5. Question 5**

What does regional organization do for UN peacekeeping in Africa?

**6. Question 6**

Do you feel that the involvement of a regional organization is important in settling conflicts between fighting factions? How much would the establishment of a regional organization be able to contribute toward the achievement of a successful UN peacekeeping operation in Africa?

## **E. EVALUATION OF THE CRITERIA**

### **Western Sahara**

F1   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F2   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F3   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F4   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F5   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

### **Liberia**

F1   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F2   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F3   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F4   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F5   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

### **Angola**

F1   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F2   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F3   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F4   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F5   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

### **Rwanda-Uganda**

F1   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F2   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F3   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F4   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F5   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

### **Mozambique**

F1   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F2   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F3   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F4   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F5   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

### **Somalia**

F1   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F2   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F3   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F4   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

F5   LOW   MEDIUM   HIGH

## **APPENDIX B**

### **UNITED NATIONS INTERVIEWEES**

The list of United Nations desk officers and military advisors interviewed at the United Nations headquarters in New York from April 11-15, 1994 is below.

#### **A. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations**

- Major J. Napoli (US), Assistant of the Head of the Planning Division

#### **B. ANGOLA**

- Mr. Dimitri Titov (Russia), Political Advisor
- Brigadier General Saksena (India), Military Advisor
- LTC Mulkowski (Poland), Desk Advisor

#### **C. LIBERIA**

- Margaret Carey (US), Military Advisor
- Captain E. Washington (Zimbabwe), Desk Officer

#### **D. MOZAMBIQUE**

- Dimitri Titov (Russia), Political Advisor
- LTC Martin (Argentina), Military Advisor
- Major Singh (India), Desk Officer

#### **E. RWANDA-UGANDA**

- LTC Martin (Argentina), Military Advisor
- Captain E. Washington (Zimbabwe), Desk Officer

**F. SOMALIA**

- Colonel Couton (France), Military Advisor

**G. WESTERN SAHARA**

Both the Military Advisor and the Desk Officer were out of town at the time of the interviews.



## **APPENDIX C**

### **GLOSSARY**

<b>UN</b>	<b>United Nations</b>
<b>US</b>	<b>United States of America</b>
<b>ECOWAS</b>	<b>Economic Community of Western African States</b>
<b>ECOMOG</b>	<b>ECOWAS Monitoring Group</b>
<b>OAU</b>	<b>Organization of African Unity</b>
<b>FENTE POLISARIO</b>	<b>Fente Popular Para La Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamrade de Orio de Oro</b>
<b>SADR</b>	<b>Sahara Arab Democratic Ppublic</b>
<b>MINURSO</b>	<b>United Nations Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara</b>
<b>SAHRAWIS</b>	<b>People of Western Sahara</b>
<b>IGNU</b>	<b>Interim Government of National Unity in Liberia</b>
<b>NPFL</b>	<b>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</b>
<b>ULIMO</b>	<b>United Liberation Movement for Democracy</b>

<b>SRSG</b>	<b>Special Representative of the Secretary General</b>
<b>UNOMIL</b>	<b>United Nations Observers Mission in Liberia</b>
<b>AFL</b>	<b>Armed Forces of Liberia</b>
<b>INPFL</b>	<b>Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia</b>
<b>RENAMO</b>	<b>Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana</b>
<b>NEC</b>	<b>National Electoral Council</b>
<b>UNAVEM</b>	<b>United Nations Angola Verification Mission</b>
<b>LAS</b>	<b>League of Arab States</b>
<b>OIC</b>	<b>Organization of Islamic Community</b>
<b>UNOSOM</b>	<b>United Nations Operations in Somalia</b>
<b>UNITAF</b>	<b>United Task Force</b>
<b>RPF</b>	<b>Rwandese Patriotic Front</b>
<b>UNOMUR</b>	<b>United Nations Observers Mission in Rwanda</b>
<b>UNAMIR</b>	<b>United Nations Observers Mission in Rwanda</b>
<b>UNITA</b>	<b>Uniao Nacional para Independencia Total de Angola (National Union for the total independence of Angola)</b>
<b>ONUMOZ</b>	<b>United Nations Mission in Mozambique</b>

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